Oil spill Management

Protesters collect outside the Hale Boggs national courthouse for BP Deepwater Horizon test on Tuesday. Photograph: Sipa United States Of America / Rex Features

Bob Bea, a professional in catastrophic manufacturing problems and an old BP expert, stated the tragedy had been a "classic failure of management and management in BP".

On second day of a municipal test in brand new Orleans, Robert Cunningham, legal counsel representing businesses and individuals struck by the tragedy, received a picture of extensive management failure on organization. In reaction, Bea informed the courtroom he'd given often "impolite" warnings to BP consistently. In 2007 he had written in their mind caution: "You still aren't getting it."

Bea, the first experience called inside sprawling municipal instance across 2010 explosion and subsequent oil spill, said: "I told BP you will findn't no surprises." He said BP had neglected to implement its highest protection requirements in gulf, even though the organization had acknowledged deepwater drilling because region represented the highest risk activities it undertook.

BP had a security system known as the working administration system (OMS) that executives referred to as the "cornerstone" of the safety practices, but which was maybe not used in the Gulf, the judge heard.

Cunningham requested exactly what share of fault BP management should simply take duty when it comes to accident. "When you are talking about the system you are not just talking about the rig, you are talking about the system all the way onshore and all the way to London, " said Cunningham. "Yes, " said Bea.

The court was shown documents finalized by Tony Hayward, BP's previous chief executive, explaining OMS as "the foundation for security at BP". Hayward will appear in movie testimony later on this week.

Bea ended up being expected why he believed the organization had not implemented that system on the Deepwater Horizon. Bea said the main factor had been cost-cutting.
Early in the day the court have been told of Bea's work on various other disasters such as the Exxon Valdez, the Petrobas P36 oil rig disaster in 2001 and Nasa's disastrous Columbia launch in 2003. Nasa's management mantra was: "Better, faster, cheaper, " stated Bea.

"here is the equal to Nasa's mantra that got them into a great deal difficulty. 'better, quicker, cheaper'; in cases like this it really is a mantra of 'every buck counts', " he said.

Bea worked as an expert for BP don and doff for a long time. He said he became increasingly concerned with their danger management systems. In 2007 whenever BP presented a safety event in Normandy he warned BP: "You still don't get it. Process security is dangerous severe and now you've switched it into a traveling road show."

Mike Brock, BP's lawyer, recommended that Bea may be experiencing "choice prejudice". He said that the plaintiffs' lawyers had aided him choose the papers now-being provided in court and utilized in their report in to the tragedy. "You agree that the plaintiffs' legal groups were focussed on finding documents that hurt BP, not help BP?" he said.

Brock requested Bea whether BP had made significant efforts to improve safety during the early 2000s. Bea said so it had. "Can you recall telling us that the positive things you found?" he asked. "Do you really recall saying that you found many, numerous signs and symptoms of BP's efforts to really improve procedure safety?" stated Brock. "Yes, " said Bea.

Legal specialists have been anticipating a settlement in the case before it began. Those speaks appears to have hit an impasse.